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Abstract
Near 1,500 governments worldwide, including over 1,000 local governments, have declared a climate emergency. Such
declarations constitute a response to the growing visibility of social movements in international politics as well as the
growing role of cities in climate governance. Framing climate change as an emergency, however, can bring difficulties in
both the identification of the most appropriate measures to adopt and the effectiveness of those measures in the long
run. We use textual analysis to examine the motivations and intended outcomes of 300 declarations endorsed by local
governments. The analysis demonstrates that political positioning, previous experience of environmental action within
local government, and pressure from civil society are the most common motivations for declaring a climate emergency at
the local level. The declarations constitute symbolic gestures highlighting the urgency of the climate challenge, but they
do not translate into radically different responses to the climate change challenge. The most commonly intended impacts
are increasing citizens’ awareness of climate change and establishing mechanisms to influence future planning and infras-
tructure decisions. However, the declarations are adopted to emphasize the increasing role cities are taking on, situating
local governments as crucial agents bridging global and local action agendas.
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1. Introduction
An emergency is a serious and unexpected incident
that requires immediate action. In its 2014 report, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; IPCC,
2014) showed with high confidence that climate change
will increase the risks from heat stress, extreme pre-
cipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, and
water scarcity in urban areas. Multiple strands of multi-
disciplinary research have documented the impacts of cli-
mate change, for example, on human health and well-
being (Committee OTEOC, 2011; Diaz, 2004; Goodwin
et al., 2017), on economies and livelihoods (Kahn et al.,
2019; Reid, Linda, Stage, &Macgregor, 2008; Stern, 2007;
Wade & Jennings, 2016), on agriculture (Dinar et al.,
1998;Maharjan& Joshi, 2013;Wanget al., 2009), andbio-
diversity (Brown et al., 2015; Jaeschke, Bittner, Jentsch, &
Beierkuhnlein, 2014; Madhusoodhanan, Sreeja, & Eldho,
2016). Based on the data on emergency events of the
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters,
7,804 natural disasters occurred between 1980 and 1999
compared to 13,388 disasters between 2000 and 2019.
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Many institutions, from the United Nations Environment
Programme to the European Parliament, characterize this
situation as a climate emergency.
Cities have been central to emergency discourses.
Darebin (Australia) was the first city in the world to
declare a climate emergency on December 5, 2016.
Three years later, more than 1,500 climate emergency
declarations had been passed by governments and juris-
dictions in 29 countries, covering a population of more
than 820 million (Cedamia, 2020). Approximately 1,000
of these correspond to local governments, of whichmost
are concentrated in high-income countries, except for
three declarations in the Philippines and one in Brazil
(Figure 1; see also Supplementary File 1).
The peak in the adoption of declarations occurred
after mid-2019, with more than 900 local declarations
adopted in the space of only a few months. This peak
occurred at the time of the release of the Global
Warming of 1.5°C IPCC report in October 2018, which
coincided with a surge in internet searches for ‘cli-
mate emergency’ and ‘climate crisis’ (Thackeray et al.,
2020). Local governments had adopted 1,000 declara-
tions by April 2020 (Figure 2). This is, however, not
a local phenomenon: Institutions at all levels of gov-
ernance, including supranational authorities and busi-
nesses, have adopted climate emergency declarations.
Moreover, in December 2020, the UN secretary-general,
António Guterres, asked all governments to declare a
state of climate emergency until the world has reached
net-zero CO2 emissions (Harvey, 2020).
The term ‘climate emergency’ has been present
in international climate politics for over two decades.
Statements from the early United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties
(the COPs) primarily urged technology transfers and
finance to support transitions in low-income countries.
However, the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC
(from 2007) and Al Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient
Truth (from 2006) marked an inflexion point in the inter-
national discourse. In 2007, after a visit to Antarctica, for-
mer UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon declared that
climate change was an emergency that required emer-
gency action (“UN chief makes Antarctica visit,” 2007).
A few months later, Spratt and Sutton (2008) published
Climate Code Red: The Case for Emergency Action, which
argued that declaring a state of emergency was a strat-
egy for governments and other institutions to move
away from ‘business as usual’ strategies to tackle climate
change (Spratt & Sutton, 2008). A network of grassroots
climate groups in Australia adopted the term ‘climate
emergency’ to demand emergency action (Cedamia,
2020). Simultaneously, emergency discourses prolifer-
ated in academic reports, policy documents, and the
media (Wilson & Orlove, 2019).
The declarations can be read as the culmination of
social movements’ efforts to raise the climate change
profile in public policy. Climate emergency discourse
brings together multiple constituencies, including estab-
lished environmental movements, direct action groups
















































Figure 1. Declarations in local governments (by countries). Source: Authors’ elaboration with information retrieved from
Cedamia.org in April 2020.
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Figure 2. Evolution in the number of declarations adopted by local governments. Source: Authors’ elaboration with infor-
mation retrieved from Cedamia.org in April 2020.
international youth movement (Fridays for Future).
These movements claim that current government
action is insufficient to address climate change (UN
Environment Programme, 2019).
This article aims to explore the scope of the climate
emergency declarations, focusing on explicitly stated
motivations and intended outcomes of local govern-
ments. The declarations emerge as a new putative mech-
anism to govern climate change in cities (Bulkeley &
Kern, 2006; Kern & Alber, 2009). Following a literature
review, our position is that emergency declarationsmedi-
ate forms of performative power that influence climate
governance at the local level. Our analysis involves a sys-
tematic examination of the motivations and intended
outcomes of 300 declarations of climate emergency
in local governments in 24 countries. The analysis of
motivations suggests that the declarations constitute
an instrument for local governments to position them-
selves in a global political landscape. However, the dec-
larations also have performative power, as local govern-
ments commit to being held to account for their deci-
sions. While the declarations may well fail to generate
new forms of rapid, transformative action to tackle cli-
mate change, they do herald new political interactions
to respond to climate change.
2. Performative Acts and the Meaning of ‘Emergency’
The emergency discourse relates to the growing salience
of an understanding of climate change as a security
issue in academic and political debates. Climate change
securitization became mainstream between 2007 and
2011 when it reached organizations such as the EU, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), and the UN (Scott, 2012; Torres Camprubí, 2016).
The framing of climate change as an existential issue, as
a crisis or a disaster, is seen by some as a move to influ-
ence the way climate change is debated and understood,
arguing that the rhetoric of emergency helps to bring cli-
mate change out of the ordinary and signals the need
for quick action (Warner & Boas, 2017). While some fear
that this securitisation shift may jeopardize decades of
humanitarian work and human development programs
(Thomas & Warner, 2019), others see it as an opportu-
nity to regulate climate change through legislation, to
make national governments more likely to assume their
responsibilities (Giles Carnero, 2016), or to turn the mil-
itary into a more valuable tool by involving them in the
response to climate change (Matthew, 2000).
Oels (2012) has described three different schools of
thought that analyse the framing of climate change as
a security threat: the Copenhagen School, the human
security perspective, and the Paris School (Oels, 2012).
The Copenhagen School is concerned with the extent
to which securitization of climate change as an existen-
tial threat may legitimise the implementation of mitiga-
tion and adaptation action via undemocratic procedures
(Scott, 2012). The human security school links climate
change to the vulnerability of local places and social
groups, shifting the focus from state security to personal
safety and sustainable development (Barnett & Adger,
2007). Finally, the Paris School argues for moving the
focus away from the securitisation of climate change
to the climatization of the security industry, as secu-
rity professionals and institutions become increasingly
engaged in climate action and debate (Oels, 2012; see
also Jayaram, 2020).
Despite its widespread use, what the term ‘emer-
gency’ refers to in the phrase ‘climate emergency’ is
unclear. There are different meanings of the concept
of emergency (Anderson & Adey, 2012). For this arti-
cle, we use a conventional definition of ‘emergency’ as
“something dangerous or severe that happens suddenly
or unexpectedly and needs rapid action to avoid harm-
ful results”, as per the Cambridge Dictionary (Emergency,
n.d.). The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (1992,
p. 34) also defines ‘emergency’ as “a sudden and usu-
ally unforeseen event that calls for immediate measures
to minimize its adverse consequences”. Both definitions
encapsulate the concerns of environmental and youth
organizations: the sense of urgency to act immediately
and the consequences of not doing so. The etymological
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root of the word emergency emphasizes ‘to arise’ or
‘to come to light.’ Does the visibility of climate change
impacts justify the use of the word emergency? Are they
coming to light now? Thewriter RobertMacfarlanemem-
orably wrote that the challenge with climate change is
that its consequences may seep into everyday life with-
out being noticed until the point at which the whole
environment has been damaged beyond repair (see
Macfarlane, 2005). On their side, the Alliance of World
Scientists issued a warning in 2019, asserting that the
world was in a climate emergency and that mitigat-
ing and adapting to climate change would entail major
transformations in our society (Ripple, Wolf, Newsome,
Barnard, & Moomaw, 2019). Although there is a per-
ception of a growing frequency of impacts that would
justify that emergency, there is also a sense that the
crisis has been brewing over decades. Indeed, in the
Declaration of the 1st World Climate Conference held by
the World Meteorological Organization in 1979, it was
agreed that it was urgently necessary for the nations
of the world to foresee and prevent potential man-
made [sic] climate changes and to develop a common
global strategy for a greater understanding of the cli-
mate (World Meteorological Organization, 1979, p. 713).
Hence, the climate emergency cannot be said to have
arisen unexpectedly.
The adoption of an emergency frame in climate action
may cause a need to question the political responses pro-
voked by the declaration of emergency, as well as their
effectiveness. Wilson and Orlove (2019) characterize a cli-
mate emergency by time pressure (which calls for imme-
diate action and may forestall regular deliberations) and
‘interval’ (the space of time in which there is an oppor-
tunity to prevent disaster). As emergencies are socially
constructed phenomena—open to contestation—they
may be formulated for political gain or to justify action
(through ‘crisification’; Wilson &Orlove, 2019). The emer-
gency framing may produce a set of emotional and cog-
nitive responses, which might shape decision making in
unintended or even counterproductive ways.
The literature on the political consequences of emer-
gency frames, in particular, demands caution in advanc-
ing emergency declarations. Emergencies often call for
drastic action and a range of situations such as ‘state
of alert,’ ‘state of readiness,’ ‘state of internal war,’ ‘sus-
pension of guarantees,’ ‘martial law’ (Neocleus, 2006),
or other extraordinary interventions (Wilson & Orlove,
2019). Historically, the outbreak of an emergency has
often led to declarations of a ‘state of emergency’ or
‘state of exception,’ that have justified harsh government
interventions during periods of war, insurrection, or ter-
rorist threat (Agamben, 2005; Fassin & Pandolfi, 2010;
Hulme, 2019). Consequently, some commentators fear
that the impacts of climate change could trigger a new
manifestation of the ‘state of exception’ in which new
forms of authoritarianism become viable (Davies, 2019).
In this article, we follow the Copenhagen School’s
understanding of securitisation. Buzan, Wæver, and
de Wilde (1998) defined securitisation as a ‘speech act,’
not interesting as a sign referring to something real, but
the utterance itself constituting the act. At the same
time, securitisation also depends on other components,
such as the acceptance of securitisation by an audience
or emergency action by agents. The securitisation of the
environment is effective only when new institutions or
strategies respond to specific securitisation objectives
(Hughes, 2007; Matthew, 1999). These observations sug-
gest that the emergency discourse has brought climate
change beyond professional spheres of securitisation,
into the public and social debate.
In terms of effectiveness, we need to understand
the role of emergency discourses in contrast to other,
more established, discourses of climate change action.
In the lectures delivered by John Austin at Harvard
University in 1955 (Austin, 1962), he proposed the exis-
tence of two kinds of utterances: ‘constatives,’ for con-
veying information, and ‘performatives,’ for perform-
ing actions. The notion of performatives captures how
language utterances ‘do things,’ in addition to stating
things (Austin, 1962). Austin’s ideas connect what is
being said and adopted (that there is a climate emer-
gency) with what is being done (the consequences of
declaring an emergency). Declaring a climate emergency
entails an action because the action of ‘declaring’ com-
pels city councils and other local actors to deliver cli-
mate change commitments. Climate declarations state
motives and respond to those motives; however, the
response can only be effective if concrete action emerges
from such statements.
3. Emergency Discourses and Local Action
The novelty of cities’ engagement with the climate
emergency is questionable given that local governments
have expressed their commitment towards environmen-
tal protection for decades. Municipal authorities had
already been profiled as champions of sustainability
in the UN-led program Agenda 21 (UN Division for
Sustainable Development, 1992), which presented local
governments as sensitive to public opinion, able to
facilitate participation, and already in charge of plan-
ning and policymaking in multiple sustainability domains
(e.g., Brugmann, 1996; Mehta, 1996). Initiatives estab-
lished in the 1990s, such as the Cities for Climate
Protection program led by the International Council for
Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), firmly located the
climate mitigation agenda within the jurisdiction of local
governments (Betsill, 2001; Bulkeley, 2000). There were
many reasons why municipal authorities took an inter-
est in emission reductions, including opportunities for
win-win action due to energy conservation lowering
costs and providing economic benefits (Bulkeley, 2000).
A broad range of ‘co-benefits’ associated with cli-
mate action at the city level has since then material-
ized, as emission reductions have been linked to a diver-
sity of sectors and policy strategies (de Oliveira, 2013;
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Doll & de Oliveira, 2017; Lee & van de Meene, 2013;
Rashidi, Stadelmann, & Patt, 2017). Examples include job
creation (e.g., through local contracting and new busi-
ness opportunities linkedwith energy efficiency improve-
ments; Betsill, 2001) as well as improved air quality and
reduced congestion (e.g., through investment in pub-
lic transport; Betsill, 2001; Thambiran & Diab, 2011).
In the last decades, nature-based solutions—responses
that emphasise nature’s role in providing environmental
services—have become the dominant discourse of local
climate action (Frantzeskaki et al., 2019). Climate miti-
gation has also increasingly become linked with estab-
lished city branding strategies coupled with economic
growth and investment through the association between
low carbon development and a set of economic develop-
ment aspirations, such as smart city and eco-city labels
(Caprotti, 2014; Hollands, 2015; Long & Rice, 2019).
Emergency declarations at the local level thus relate
to existing trajectories of climate action and urban
resilience concerns. Lack of action following the dec-
laration of climate emergency can harm local govern-
ments’ credibility. For government institutions, credibil-
ity depends on achieving consistency between words
and deeds (Kouzes & Posner, 2011; Lewicki & Bunker,
1996; Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). Whatever
their role, political leaders or social activists must act in
ways consistent with the values of the people they rep-
resent (Kouzes & Posner, 2011). Deficits in political legit-
imacy may emerge if credible action plans and forceful
implementation do not match emergency declarations.
Further, nobody can predict the consequences and
appropriations of an utterance, such as a climate emer-
gency declaration. Derrida (1988) argued that if an utter-
ance is performable, it can also be distorted, reused,
misused, misperformed, changed, and twisted in some
new way (Robinson, 2003). For Derrida, there was a dan-
ger in the opportunities to reimagine language and its
performativity in different contexts. Austin and Searle
suggested that utterances adopted outside their proper
contexts may become ‘parasite speech acts’ because
they ‘act’ but in ways in which they cannot be taken as
serious or literal (Austin, 1962). Parasitic speech acts are
different from normal speech acts because of the lack of
alignment betweenmotivations and the utterance—and
its consequences (Halion, 1989). Utterances can also be
parasitic if they pose a danger to the context in which
they are pronounced.
Appropriations happen in every utterance. The con-
stant use of the phrase ‘climate emergency’ distorts its
meaning within climate change debates. The declara-
tions themselves will constitute a problem if the lack of
consistency betweenmotivations and responses leads to
a devaluation of emergency discourse, without an alter-
native to substitute it. Aside from promoting authoritar-
ianism, as feared by some, subtler risks may be embed-
ded in emergency declarations if they direct social efforts
for collective action in ways that do not promote the
overall public good. Indeed, the declaration of climate
emergencies has received criticism for being too narrow
when positioning climate change against other pressing
issues (e.g., poverty, economic and social inequality),
and for expressing a new form of a democratic ‘green
populism’ (Davies, 2019; Hulme, 2019).
The climate emergency declarations appear to have
created momentum for climate action and galvanised
a social movement. They may have opened spaces
for collaboration within the geographies in which they
have been declared. However, there is considerable
uncertainty about their role and potential. We propose
to examine the motivations and intended outcomes
embedded in local governments’ emergency declara-
tions as a first step towards exploring their role in
local governance.
4. Methodology
Cedamia.org (derived from “Climate Emergency Declar-
ation and Mobilisation in Action”) is a campaign to
promote climate emergency declarations at all levels
of government, in partnership with the Council Action
in the Climate Emergency (CACE). Margaret Hender
and Philip Sutton manage a website and a Facebook
group that provide access to available declarations.
We selected 300 declarations from local governments
available from this archive (Supplementary File 1) which,
in total, cover a population of over 85.6 million peo-
ple. To identify declarations for analysis, we selected
all declarations (148 in total) from countries that had
issued less than 25 declarations (from countries with
only two declarations, such as Brazil and Sweden, to
those with up to 25 declarations, such as Germany).
Next, we selected 152 documents from the six coun-
tries with more than 25 declarations adopted by cities
with more than 50,000 people. When the information
on the declaration contained in the archive was limited
to simply the acknowledgement of a declaration hav-
ing been made, we resorted to additional documents to
obtain information on the motivations and intended out-
comes of the emergency declaration. Those additional
documents included press articles available for cities that
reported the declaration’s adoption, the minutes from
the public meetings that led to the declaration, and pub-
lic statements or interviews discussing their importance.
We analysed the original declarations in English, Swedish,
French, Italian, and Spanish. For any other languages, we
used translated versions.
We compared the declarations in an excel spread-
sheet,which allowed for systematic comparison and eval-
uation of patterns across cases. The 300 declarations
were coded according to a set of pre-defined categories
for motivations and intended outcomes. It is important
to note that many declarations include multiple motiva-
tions behind their adoption (while some did not provide
any motivation). As a result, the sum of N is greater than
300. Each co-author coded 100 declarations, followed by
a revision of each others’ coding. Tables 1 and 2 provide
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an overview of the themes and their frequencies. For
motivations, we also compiled a table exemplifying the
topics with quote examples (Supplementary File 2).
5. Motivations to Adopt Climate Declarations
Our analysis of the motivations behind the declarations
shows that local governments operate in the interface
between international discourse and place-based con-
cerns. There are various mechanisms at play, which we
have grouped into three sets of rationales: political posi-
tioning, articulation of local concerns, and pressure from
the civil society (Table 1). While most cities cited multi-
ple reasons behind the adoption, 15% of authorities in
our sample did not explain their rationale at all.
The first set ofmotivations relate to political position-
ing and international signalling of climate action inten-
tions. A third of the declarations presented such moti-
vation with reference to international policy (for exam-
ple, references to the Paris Agreement and the SDGs,
international events such as the Rio Summit or the COP
conferences, or regulatory instruments such as the Kyoto
Protocol and EU directives). Many declarations explic-
itly mention IPCC reports, mainly the target to keep
global average temperature changes under 1.5°C. These
motivations were similarly phrased across municipalities
(especially declarations within the same country, such
as Belgium), suggesting that local governments shared
templates. These similarities suggest that the declara-
tions do not necessarily reflect local knowledge of inter-
national politics.
A different political positioning style is visible con-
cerning other government institutions within the sphere
of influence of a particular local government. Many dec-
larations (14% of declarations) were adopted following
the declaration of emergency in other local governments
within a given regional or national context. Positioning
local government in relation to higher government lev-
els was also common (10% of declarations). Declarations
are presented as advocacy exercises to demand the
transfer of funds, respond to higher-level resolutions, or
highlight federal and state governments’ lack of action.
A final political justification was to respond to local
party politics (6% of declarations). For example, many
German cities declared a climate emergency following
the request of Fridays for Future, which was supported
by the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party.
The same occurred in cities in Belgium and Spain, where
the greens tabled motions to pass declarations. In some
cities, opposition groups proposed the declaration as a
strategy to obtain political visibility. Here, the political
environment was an essential factor, as green and left-
green parties played a central role in many cases.
The second set of motivations relates to specific
conditions associated with climate change. The most
common was a history of local government commit-
ment to sustainability and identity of environmental
leadership (e.g., commitments to emission reductions,
carbon neutral targets, and participation in transna-
tional networks; 24% of declarations). For instance,
the Declaration of Recife (Brazil) mentioned that their
Mayor is the president of ICLEI South America. Tacoma
(US) located the declaration within its history as
one of the US’s most contaminated sites, which has
inspired decades of environmental engagement. This
rhetoric echoes Agenda 21 discourses, viewing local
government—the authority closest to the people—as
holding special responsibility to advance sustainability
and protect future generations. Many of these justifica-
tions communicate an unmistakable sense of pride in
the city’s trajectory of environmental action. Links with
social issues also emerged, such as precariousness and
social exclusion, fuel poverty, and impacts on the home-
less (6% of declarations). Many cities in France associ-
ated the declarationwith the yellow vest protests against
rising fuel prices.
Motivations related to local conditions also included
the experience of climate impacts (9% of declarations).
In Australia, for example, the declarations referred to
stress on water resources and the death of animals,
Table 1. Summary of motivations to declare a climate emergency (Supplementary File 2).
Motivation behind adoption N Frequency
None No explicit rationale 46 0.15
Political positioning International policy 100 0.33
Following other cities 44 0.14
Positioning vis-a-vis higher-level government 29 0.10
Party politics 19 0.06
Local concerns History of environmental commitment 71 0.24
Awareness of climate risks 32 0.11
Previous impacts 28 0.09
Link to social concerns 16 0.06
Pressure from civil society Pressure from citizen and environmental groups 65 0.22
Pressure from a single NGO 35 0.12
Supporting school strikes 27 0.09
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storms, floods, and fires. A similar rationale was the
awareness of current and future risks (11% of declara-
tions). For instance, Prague’s declaration was adopted
after an investigation that demonstrated links between
heat and the absence of green space. Other declara-
tions pointed to future risks of heat exposure, flooding,
sea-level rise, storm surges, and increased risk of dis-
ease. Some declarations referred to regional conditions,
such as the vulnerability of the Mediterranean in cities
in Spain and France, or, in several Japanese declarations,
the prevalence of typhoons.
The third set of motivations followed pressure from
civil society. Many declarations referred to citizens’
petitions or the combined pressure from protests and
the demands of local groups (22% of declarations).
The largest number of such motivations were in Canada,
where NGOs and activists exerted pressure through peti-
tions, participation at council meetings, and protests.
There were instances where a history of environmental
activism and conflict was a strong influence, such as in
Hualpén in Chile. The recurrent mentions of some envi-
ronmental groups in the declarations suggest that those
groups have influenced public discourses, such as Rise
for Climate in Belgium, Extinction Rebellion in theUK and
New Zealand, People Before Profit in Ireland, and Fridays
for the Future in Germany and Italy.
What is the relationship between these motivations
and the act of declaring an emergency? First, the rea-
sons to declare an emergency rarely describe a newly
emerged, urgent challenge; that is, something danger-
ous or serious that happens suddenly or unexpectedly.
About 9% find motivation in recent climate change-
related impacts, but, for most, the justification builds
on science, international policy, and global, rather than
local, urgency. Second, while only some declarations
contain an explicit call for action, many consolidate
and showcase environmental commitment trajectories,
where climate change is rarely seen as a new, unex-
pected event. Continuity (long-term action) rather than
sudden responses appear to be more central to emer-
gency declarations (Wilson & Orlove, 2019). The per-
formative element of the emergency declarations con-
sists ofmodelling examples of climate action and increas-
ing social mobilization momentum, rather than foster-
ing action in the specific locales where the declarations
are adopted.
6. Intended Outcomes of Emergency Declarations
The arguments in terms of the intended outcomes of
the declarations are polarised. On one extreme, declara-
tions are criticised as mere forms of signification, polit-
ical moves with little more than symbolic value. Some
politicians openly express that they are meeting public
demands without committing to anything in particular.
For example, in Villingen-Schwenningen (Germany) offi-
cials proposed that committing to the declaration ‘would
not hurt.’ On the other extreme, the declarations consti-
tute a commitment to action, connected to precise and
specific demands from societal groups and the start of
a path towards practical action for local governments,
as exemplified for example, in the presentation of dec-
larations in Irish municipalities as heralding a new way
of doing climate politics aligning climate change and bio-
diversity concerns. The reality is usually something in
between. Declarations result from both elements, the
symbolic and the practical because both symbolic and
practical elements are intimately linked in a performa-
tive utterance of this kind. Accordingly, most declara-
tions provided evidence of both.
Table 2 presents an overview of the intended out-
comes identified in the sample of declarations reviewed.
A variety of intentions to achieve impact are embedded
in the declarations. 52 declarations could not be linked to
intendedoutcomes (17%). Almost half of the declarations
(46%) show ‘aspirational outcomes,’ that is, intended
outcomes in terms of the conception of the local gov-
ernment as an active agent in climate change action,
the need to show leadership, and the embedded belief
that this is a moment to ‘change minds.’ Some of the
strategies repeated across declarations show a deliberate
alignment of the declaration with ongoing strategies to
deliver sustainability. For example, some declarations are
aligned with concerns about other environmental issues,
such as waste management in Japan. In countries like
Ireland and Italy, the declarations emphasize the consid-
eration of the climate emergency with a parallel biodi-
versity emergency, as reflected in the Intergovernmental
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES) report. Statements of specific targets
were less frequent. Many local governments aligned
themselves with targets at higher governance levels, but
9% of the declarations established specific targets for
their city. The action of setting a target establishes a
benchmark for accountability alongside a direction for
the action. Some of the declarations (11%) set explicit
environmental education objectives.
A third of the declarations proposed specific actions
to shape ongoing governance processes. For example,
19% of declarations promised to undertake planning
activities, such as a Climate Action Plan or the deliber-
ate integration of climate change-related measures in
ongoing efforts at Masterplanning or Transport Planning.
About 9% of the declarations stated that local govern-
ment operations would mainstream climate change, for
example, using climate impact assessments for any new
developments and policies. Very few (10 declarations out
of 300) made provisions for mobilizing economic and
financial resources for climate action, whether through
finance, making an explicit request to other government
levels, or committing a part of the existing budget.
A quarter of the declarations position the local gov-
ernment as a central actor providing coordination or cli-
mate change action leadership. 13% of the declarations
are explicit about the local government’s role to nudge
other government levels to take action. Many declara-
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Table 2. Summary of intended outcomes of declaring a climate emergency.
Intended outcomes of the declaration N Frequency
Aspirational objectives 139 0.46
Aligning declaration to ongoing strategies 79 0.26
Environmental education for citizens 34 0.11
Setting specific targets 26 0.09
No clear aspirational outcomes 161 0.54
Direct impact on existing governance processes 95 0.32
Integration of climate change into impact assessments 28 0.09
Mobilization of economic resources 10 0.03
Planning (from Transport Planning to Masterplanning) 57 0.19
No practical outcomes 205 0.68
Coordination with other actors 75 0.25
Multi-level dialogue 36 0.12
Nudge other government levels into action 39 0.13
No multi-level changes 225 0.75
Restrictions on further action 32 0.11
Create new municipal or other institutions, e.g., working group or committee 25 0.08
Move away from fossil fuels 7 0.02
Restrict future municipal decisions 20 0.07
tions identify the institution to be reached and the chan-
nels of communication to make it possible. The decla-
rations are themselves part of that nudge. About 12%
of the declarations focus on creating a multi-level dia-
logue to build forms of horizontal governance, bringing
together communities, enabling participatory processes,
or enabling civil society actors to act for climate change.
Finally, just over 11% of the declarations contain
explicit attempts restricting future action. Of those, 8%
commit local governments to create a specific body to
deal with the climate emergency, be it a dedicated com-
mittee within the local government or a multi-actor con-
ference. Also, 7% of the declarations pledge to enshrine
climate change in local government operation frame-
works so that climate concerns will influence and restrict
future council decisions. Finally, a few declarations com-
mit to divestment on fossil fuels (only 7 out of 300).
The analysis above shows that the declarations are
themselves performative by proposing policy changes
that align the operation of local government with its
stated motivations; the integration of climate change
in planning and impact assessment; the mediation of
multi-level dialogues across government, civil society,
and business; and the construction of a coherent mes-
sage to influence governance futures. The declarations
also shape what a climate emergency is and how to
approach it. Rather than providing a sense of urgency in
climate responses, the declarations emphasize the need
to change climate politics by situating local governments
as crucial agents bridging global and local action agendas.
‘Less haste, more speed’ is the motto of a report from
Arup on how local governments can respond to the cli-
mate emergency (Arup, 2019). This report’s keymessage
is that addressing the climate emergency entails redefin-
ing local governance. Redefining local governance seems
to be the main purpose of local emergencies, although
the extent to which this has happened is unclear.
7. Conclusions
Emergency declarations can be read as positioning exer-
cises without a real impact on climate change moti-
vations and stressors. However, our analysis also sug-
gests that there are good reasons to be optimistic about
them: They have a performative component that man-
ifests both in the motivations for making them and
their intended outcomes. Such declarations have multi-
ple effects, from modelling environmental action trajec-
tories to fostering multi-level dialogues. They anticipate
practical effects in changing local governance, from shap-
ing planning and making future commitments to setting
targets, although evidence of those changes is not avail-
able in this assessment.
The adoption of the declarations shows the limited
geography of a ‘climate declarations movement’ related
to the emergency discourse, as most declarations were
adopted in six countries: the UK (with 44% of the declara-
tions), Australia, Germany, Canada, USA, and Italy (with
67 declarations). Accordingly, the declarations’ motiva-
tions emphasize questions of responsibility instead of
questions of risk and security and leave drivers of struc-
tural vulnerability untouched. The analysis of motiva-
tions suggests that proximity was an important factor in
adopting declarations, whether because other local gov-
ernments acted asmodels or because theywere exposed
to similar pressures. The declarations appear as a collec-
tive event rather than multiple instances that should be
looked at in isolation.
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Are climate emergency declarations, then, ‘consta-
tive’ or ‘performative’? In consideration of Austin’s
(1962) reflections, local governments can adopt a cli-
mate emergency to allow the constative (the statement
of declaring the emergency) to function performatively
(the mere fact of adopting the emergency constitutes
an action). If the declaration absolves further interven-
tion, it would be counterproductive to support local cli-
mate action. Suppose the adoption of the emergency
declarations in themselves is seen as constituting deci-
sive action (suggesting that no further measures are
required once the declaration is adopted). In that case,
it could be directly detrimental to making progress in
climate protection at the local level. The declarations
prefigure action to move local governments to change
some practices, but they hardly envisage transforma-
tive actions. As explained above, only 11% of declara-
tions foray into institutional change, for example, restrict-
ing municipal decisions or facilitating divesting. None
of those offer examples of undemocratic, authoritarian
action advanced under the discourse of emergency. In
line with this, the declarations do not demonstrate that
climate change is being successfully securitised in these
countries. Declaring a climate emergency is not evidence
of securitisation, particularly without evidence of action
by agents within the securitisation industry (Warner &
Boas, 2017). Our findings do not confirm that securiti-
sation follows public declarations of climate emergency,
in town hall meetings, or with climate activists’ par-
ticipation. Rather a successful climatization seems to
be observed in spheres of economic policy, in military
investments, or in the changes of discourses in the secu-
rity industry that hardly intervene in the emergency dec-
larations at the local level (Oels, 2012).
Our research suggests that local climate politics have
been changed by adopting emergency declarations at
the local level. The collective stand of 1,500 local gov-
ernment authorities from around the world, at the very
least, signals a spirit of solidarity and unity that may
support further action and ambition. It shows the role
cities are willing to play at the international level to
give answers to global challenges and respond to the
demands of an increasingly aware society. The decla-
rations have been an opportunity to renew the cities’
compromises in the fight against climate change and to
deal with the clear demands of a part of the population
that were seeking greater engagement at the local level.
As Hulme (2019) reminds us, once a climate emergency
is declared, it is hard to see how it can be undeclared;
the question then becomes how will cities deliver their
promises and how will it impact their credibility. In this
sense, the emergency declarations may be performative
by producing enduring alliances and lasting perceptions
of what it means to live in a society under threat of cli-
mate change. At the same time, the research also indi-
cates that most cities have not adopted plans or initia-
tives that go much further than those that were already
planned and that the declaration of emergency does not
differ much in terms of plans to reduce emissions or
adapt to climate change at the local level.
What we found absent in the climate emergency
declarations examined was the question of urgency.
The declarations recast climate change urgency as a
call for shaping climate change governance, rather than
rushing into delivering hasty or ill-conceived measures.
From collaborative governance approaches to public
consultations and legitimacy-buildingmeasures, the dec-
larations herald a different era in climate change poli-
tics at the local level. Rather than driving local govern-
ments towards a state of exception—opening the door
for authoritarian politics—the declarations constitute
an anchor to dialogue across local government, social
movements, and the private sector. In the context of
increasing political polarization, the declarations estab-
lish bridges for dialogue at the local level. Bridges are
also visible in the growingmovements for climate justice,
which emphasize the impacts of transitions on disadvan-
taged groups.
In summary, the emergency declarations are nei-
ther effective in creating a new age of climate action at
the local level nor are they as dangerous as securitisa-
tion scholars suggest. While the emergency declarations
seemed to have captured a particular moment of social
concern regarding climate change, they follow a long tra-
jectory of climate action at the local level. Maintaining
the momentum seems to be the name of the game.
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